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With all the recent books by the established and emerging scholars
regarding questions of constitutional theory, it is hard enough to find
time to read all the works, let alone review them seriously. Robert Nagel's
set of essays, Constitutional Cultures,' deserves, however, contemplative
analysis. Nagel's essays question, challenge, and generally condemn the
"formulaic style" common to contemporary constitutional adjudication.
He persuasively argues that the approach to constitutional adjudication
and judicial review modeled on the decision of Brown v. Board of
Education2 has not worked and that, in fact, this formulaic style has been
* Copyright David S. Day, 1990. Professor of Law, University of South Dakota
Law School. B.A., University of Iowa; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law. I
want to thank Beth Miner O'Toole for her research assistance and Noelle Sinclair
and Tim Rensch for reading early drafts of this essay. I appreciate the many
observations of my students in the Constitutional Theory Seminar where, along
with other recent works, Constitutional Cultures was the subject of discussion. I
also appreciate the helpful substantive suggestions, and encouragement, from
Professor Mary Dudziak.
I R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES (1989) [hereinafter R. NAGEL].
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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counterproductive because it has assaulted traditional values and debased
the "popular culture's" understanding of the Constitution.3
Because of his conclusions about the destructive consequences of mod-
ern constitutional litigation, Nagel reaches an incommodious view of the
role of activist judicial review. With considerable flair, he argues that the
Constitution would be better off without most of the recent judicial de-
cisions regarding the Constitution and, more certainly, without most con-
stitutional lawyers.1
Nagel's thesis regarding the assaultive nature of modern constitutional
doctrines on the "popular" cultural understanding of the Constitution is
striking and, in many ways, attractive. Although he may be an ironic
spokesperson for the so-called "popular culture," his approach has a re-
current populist theme.5 Although his critique of the modern doctrines
is multi-faceted, he ultimately bases his critique on a premise that the
general public's understanding of the guarantees in the Constitution is
fundamentally more sound than that of certain elites which have devel-
oped in the law schools, the legal community, and the judiciary (partic-
ularly federal judges).6
3 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 57 (the Court's free speech decisions have "erode[d]
popular support"); id. at 58. See Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, 6 CONST.
COMMENTARY 289, 293 (1989) [hereinafter Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution]
("constant reference to constitutional principles, conceived [in the formulaic style],
seriously impoverishes public debate.") In this post-book article, Nagel continues
his theme-again with great flair. In the article, he expands the analysis in his
book, including attention to some of the abortion rights decisions which, curiously,
were largely omitted from the book. See id. at 298 & n.7. But see, Nelson, Con-
stitutional Aspects of the Elections, in THE ELECTIONS OF 1988 25 (M. Nelson ed.
1989) (public consideration of constitutional issues has not been impoverished).
Unfortunately, Nagel never provides in his book an explicit definition of his
term "popular culture." Compare Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Dis-
course: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 601, 645 (1990) (defining the term "community"); id.
at 634 (defining the term "public"). In Nagel's book, therefore, a reader must infer
the meaning of popular culture from the discussion. Taken in totality of his book,
Nagel's term "popular culture" appears to refer to something that might be so-
ciologically described as the traditional, middle-class value system that was the
product of the post-World War I era.
Nagel also never defines his term, the "larger culture." For present purposes,
I am going to assume that the "larger culture" is synonymous with the "popular
culture." I shall also assume that both are distinctly "nonlawyer" cultures.
41 would like to add some praise, apart from the substantive position argued,
for Nagel's writing style. This set of essays has many small gems sprinkled
throughout the text. For example, when discussing the Court's rational basis
analysis, Nagel concludes that "the rationality test ... operates like a shell game,
with the outcome dependent on the judge's willingness to change the level of
generality." R. Nagel, supra note 1, at 95. See also id. at 43 and 58.
sSee M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 164 (1988).
It is hard to disagree with Nagel's pessimism about some aspects of the history
of constitutional interpretation. There have been many problematic decisions,
and many of the successes are, at best, a mixed blessing. See generally P. IRONS,
THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 13-36, 231-52, 355-78 (1988). Even so, I am
not entirely convinced that a full-scale adoption of Nagel's reticent view of con-
stitutional interpretation would bring us to any better position than the relative




At the risk of being formulaic, I have three objections to Nagel's free
speech analysis. First, the book is flawed because basic terms are never
defined or adequately explained. Second, I think the "fundamental prem-
ise" of Nagel's critique of the modern free speech doctrine is misguided.
Third, even if Nagel's premise might be accepted, I believe the material
assembled in support of his argument falls seriously short of persuasive-
ness.
I. THE GENERAL CRITIQUE OF THE "FORMULAIC CONSTITUTION"
Nagel's set of essays are organized around his critique of the "formulaic"
style now common to judicial review.7 According to Nagel's argument,
the formulaic style derives from an attachment to rationality. Nagel then
proceeds to examine the history and impact of the formulaic style in
several doctrinal areas: free speech, s federalism,9 and the rational basis
analysis of the equal protection doctrine. 10 He finds that each of these
doctrinal areas has been tainted, to one degree or another, by a cultural
mentality amongst lawyers that, despite counter-productive effects, ins-
ists on a "rationality" approach to decisionmaking. 11 The problem with
the formulaic style, according to Nagel, is that it has triggered an "as-
saultive" jurisprudence. 12
Although I am probably a captive of the "culture" that Nagel critiques, I am
not persuaded by the examples he provides. While this book's sophisticated, post-
Reaganistic populism is attractive, Nagel's argument flounders, in part, on the
same deficiency for which he flails the modern doctrines. Even recognizing that
Nagel's essays are only preliminary efforts, it seems to me that he has not sup-
ported his argument any more persuasively than some of the various modern
"liberal" doctrines have been supported.
I Nagel's analysis of the assaultive jurisprudence starts with the assumption
that "constitutional meaning.., must seem to be plain to those who are governed
by it." R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 17. The problem with the formulaic style, then,
is that it is the antithesis of "plainness."
Under the present circumstances, I shall not be able to examine all the features
of Nagel's criticism of the "formulaic" style. I wish to proceed to Nagel's empirical
assertions about the effects of such a culture on the popular understanding of the
Constitution. I should note, however, that Nagel seems to undervalue the tra-
ditional rationale for the use of formulaic standards. These standards are the
"formal methods by which judges will be constrained." M. TUSHNET, supra note
5, at 163.
1 See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, Chapter 3. Previously, for several years, I have
assigned one of Nagel's law review articles to students in my First Amendment
Rights class. See Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 303 (1984) ("the assumptions upon which [Free Speech
doctrine] rests are largely unproven and often doubtful."). This article serves as
the basis for chapter three of the book. See infra note 84.
'See id., Chapter 4.
10 See id., Chapters 5 and 6. See also Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972) (a student Note by Nagel).
R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 11.
1 See id. at 46 ("public sympathy for free speech will be jeopardized").
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A. Nagel's "No Big Deal" Theory of the Brown Decision
One of the strengths of the book is that Nagel confronts the "fulcrum
on which the world of judicial review"'3 turns-the unanimous decision
by the Court in Brown v. Board of Education.1 The conventional wisdom
of modern constitutional jurisprudence is that Brown and its progeny
permanently changed the constitutional landscape, in terms of civil lib-
erties and the states' role in a constitutional system. 15 "Brown was," as
Professor Robert Burt has recently stated, "the most ambitious invocation
of judicial authority in this century."'6
1. Brown as a "Model"
To his credit, Nagel recognizes the conventional perception of Brown:
the decision was a jurisprudential turning point. In fact, he believes that
Brown was "the most significant event for [federal] judges and scholars"'7
and became a model. Nagel argues, however, that use of the Brown model
triggered the era of judicial activism that has left the judiciary as the
"antagonist to the popular culture.' 8
As discussed below, although he believes the result in Brown was cor-
rect, Nagel severely critiques the post-Brown judiciary for assuming a
mantle as "critic and reformer of the general culture."'19 Nagel, however,
does not see the judicial activism as an inevitable feature of the post-
Brown jurisprudence. In fact, his argument that the courts should try to
"accomplish less"' 20 is premised on an unusual, if not novel, understanding
of Brown.
Rather than viewing Brown as particularly "ambitious," Nagel argues
that the statutory school segregation attacked in Brown was "a regional
aberration within the national culture '2 1 and, therefore, that the Brown
court merely enforced "the [law] practiced by the dominant national cul-
ture. 2 2 The Court, according to Nagel, was really a follower-not the
13 Id. at 4.
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 4. See Carter, The Warren Court and Desegre-
gation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 246 (1968) ("[Brown] marks a divide in American
life.").
16 R. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES 91 (1988).
'1 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 154.
'
8 1d. at 155.
19 Id.
20 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 155.
11 Id. at 5.
22 Id. But see M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 186 n.19 (The Brown decision
"certainly was not compelled by any theory prevalent in 1954.").
To the extent that Nagel suggests that the outcome in Brown was a "slam
dunk," I would note that the legal community, as well as the public, was divided
on the merits of the case. Even Justice William Rehnquist, then a Supreme Court
clerk, had not "finally settled in my own mind on" the merits of overruling Plessy
v. Ferguson. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate: Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the




social leader of the conventional wisdom. Brown, according to Nagel's
revisionist view, was "no big deal." More significantly for his general
thesis of assaultive jurisprudence, Brown was an "easy" case.
23
2. Brown as a Model of Non-assaultive Jurisprudence
Apart from his suggestion that Brown was a simple exercise in major-
itarian control, Nagel also argues that the Brown decision was fully
justified. Nagel asserts that, in Brown, the Court properly relied on "a
body of common experience 2 4 regarding the effect of de jure segregation.
From this analysis of Brown, Nagel generalizes that all constitutional
decisionmaking should be predicated on such "common experience" as
opposed to "formulaic" analysis. 5
Nagel's conclusions about Brown are tantalizing. Moreover, the impli-
cations of his views about Brown are sobering. Although he recognizes
the Brown decision as a pivotal one, he argues that Brown should not be
viewed as a normal example of constitutional interpretation.
26 Instead of
viewing the Brown decision, and the underlying litigation leading up to
it, as a norm for constitutional interpretation, Nagel believes it should
be viewed as "extraordinary. '27 Instead of looking to Brown as a model
of principled decisionmaking, Nagel argues that Brown is the sort of
decision that judges should undertake only when no other recourse is
available.
28
3. The "Hard" Problems of Brown as an "Easy" Case
Nagel's relatively easy explanation for Brown supports his view that
it should be set aside instead of being used as a model. There are, however,
at least two problematic aspects to Nagel's rejection of the conventional
wisdom about Brown.
One problematic aspect is that Nagel's unconventional contentions
about Brown are not persuasive. First, he provides no authority, or even
an argument, for his assertion that Brown addressed only a "regional
aberration. '29 Second, Nagel's assertions about the limited nature of the
23 See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 407 (1985). Nagel suggests
that, since public school segregation was only a regional aberration, the Brown
decision was, to use a popular vernacular, "no big deal."
R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 5. At least as of 1954, it does not appear that the
Brown decision was viewed as an "easy" case. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1959).
25 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 5.
216 Id. at 4.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 25 ("[Tihe Constitution does not apply to many public issues . .
- See id. at 4. Brown was, of course, a Kansas case, not exactly from the deep
South.
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segregation attacked in Brown do not appear to be self-evident. 30 Third,
Nagel's assertion is flatly inconsistent with the Brown court's statement
that "segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of
sectional concern." 31
Moreover, while the conventional wisdom identifies the Brown decision
as a nationally significant development, some recent scholarship iden-
tifies the international importance of Brown. The foreign policy impli-
cations of racial segregation in the Cold War era were an important factor
in shaping the federal government's position in the Brown case,3 2 and the
Brown decision apparently had a significant international impact.
"Brown," according to Professor Mary Dudziak, "laundered the principles
of democracy in the eyes of the world. '33
Thus, under either the conventional wisdom regarding Brown, or an un-
derstanding of its role in the context of "Cold War" international relations,
the Brown decision was constitutionally significant for the entire nation.
Under these circumstances, Nagel's assertion that Brown addressed only a
"regional" problem may be creative, but it is hardly persuasive.
A second problematic aspect is that Nagel's justification for the Brown
decision rests on the narrowest possible grounds. Nagel essentially
concurs 34 in the Court's reliance on the psychological and sociological
data presented by the Brown plaintiffs.3  While recognizing that the clear
congressional intent underlying the Fourteenth Amendment did not
reach public school desegregation, 3 the Court's reliance on the social
scientific data was, of course, the most controversial aspect of Brown.37
Therefore, in his defense of the result in Brown as well as in his un-
derstanding of the historic circumstances in the nation at the time of the
Brown decision, Nagel's analysis of Brown distinctly cuts against the
conventional wisdom. 38 Although his revisionist assertions are not par-
30 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 186 n.19; R. BURT, supra note 16, at 91
(de jure segregated public schools were "a widespread, passionately espoused
social practice").31 Brown, 347 U.S. at 491 n.6 (emphasis added).
31 Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV 61, 65
(1988).
Id. at 118.
34 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 139 (praise of Brown's reliance on psychological
data).
31 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 & nn.10-11.
3 Nagel recognizes that the Brown decision disregarded considerable evidence
of Congressional intent. See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 4. See also Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 64-65
(1955).
37 See Wechsler, supra note 24, at 31-34; A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ,
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 609 (6th ed. 1983); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (3d ed. 1988). Even today, reliance on such
data is considered by many to be the weakest rationale for the Brown opinion.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1476 (2d ed. 1988). See also R.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 76 (1990) (reliance on the social science data
in Brown would be "disingenuous").
3 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491, n.6; Schauer, supra note 23 at 408 (Brown and




ticularly persuasive, Nagel's understanding of the Brown decision is the
linchpin of his critique of the post-Brown activist judicial review in the
constitutional system. Accordingly, I shall turn to the larger, post-Brown
set of issues.
B. Nagel's Proposed Non-Formulaic Constitution
Building on his "non-model" concept of the Brown decision, Nagel pur-
sues an analysis of the modern state of judicial review. Nagel's general
critique of judicial activism starts with two basic premises. First, he lists
various governmental "successes" which have not been dependent on
judicial interpretation: 39 for example, the turnover of the Presidency to
the victorious candidate; the timely assembly of Congress; and the con-
tinued existence of the states in the federal system. Second, he asserts
that a large number of decisions since Brown have mistakenly involved
judicial efforts to set themselves "apart from the larger culture."'4 More-
over, Nagel argues that these adversarial approaches have cast "the ju-
diciary as antagonist to the popular culture.
41
Given his assertion about these antagonistic decisions, Nagel makes a
point that seems, on its face, self-explanatory. He says the Court "cannot
routinely assault that culture.."42 It is hard to argue, at least in the ab-
stract, with that point. The question, however, is whether the Court's
decisions have, in fact, been so assaultive. To that end, Nagel examines
several areas of the modern doctrine.
Nagel has identified many features of the doctrines as antagonistic to
the popular culture. Some examples, for the moment, will have to suffice.
For example, since he believes that the Court's equal protection analysis
in the area of gender discrimination is unsound, Nagel critiques the
landmark Frontiero v. Richardson 43 decision as "social theorizing.
'44 Sim-
ilarly, Nagel is critical of the Craig v. Boren45 decision which developed
the intermediate scrutiny standard for gender discrimination.4 He be-
rates the Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur4 7 decision preventing,
under an irrebuttable presumption doctrine, discrimination against preg-
9 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 125. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 60 (con-
sidering Nagel to be a "contention textualist" partially because he relies so heavily
on such "mathematical" examples).
40 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 154. Nagel analogizes the formulaic courts to an
"arrogant modern painter or composer." Id. at 155.
41 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 155.
42 Id. at 156.
43 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 150.
45 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
46 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 115.
47 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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nant public school teachers.48 The Court's racial discrimination decisions
protecting minority persons also receive criticism. Nagel has, for example,
only scorn for the dissent in the Bakke case.49
Nagel's critique extends beyond equal protection. Regarding substan-
tive due process, for example, he has particularly sarcastic criticism 50 for
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,5 1 the Court's decision
regarding the constitutionality of state regulation of consensual, homo-
sexual sodomy. In addition, his vigorous support for the since-overruled
National League of Cities v. Usery5 2 decision constitutes a powerful cri-
tique of the Court's modern Commerce Clause doctrine.53
In addition to equal protection and federalism, the free speech doctrine
is Nagel's penultimate example of assaultive jurisprudence. Nagel is, in
fact, severely critical of the Court's decisions in the free speech area, 54
particularly the Schad v. Mt. Ephraim and Cohen v. California66 deci-
sions.57 In general, Nagel criticizes the modern free speech doctrine for
protecting "silly, unsavory or dangerous activities"58 and for imposing
constitutional restraints on the government when it tries to regulate
"trivial or seamy factual situations. '5 9
4 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 117-18. The Court's use of the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine was subsequently limited by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749(1975). See Case Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Due Process- The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine- Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), 1976
B.Y.U. L. REV. 565, 578 (citing, at 582 n.95, Nagel's student Note).49University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); R. NAGEL,
supra note 1, at 152.
51 Id. at 206 n.46.
r' See 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
1 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 64-65.
1 Id. at 57.
U 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
.6 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
11 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 44-45 (Cohen) and 39 (Schad). He also critiques
the decision in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), concluding that
it "effectively strips the First Amendment of much of its moral utility." R. NAGEL,
supra note 1, at 49.5 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 47.
56 Id. at 46. In some cases, even where Nagel seems to agree with the Court's
analysis, he is intensely critical of the Court's rationale. With respect to New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), for example, he criticizes the Court for failing
to rely on what might be termed "harm to the consuming community" as a basis
for outlawing child pornography. See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 204 n.28. Such
criticism seems misplaced.
The Ferber court relied on the harm caused to children who are involved in
the production of child pornography. 458 U.S. at 758 ("the use of children as
subjects"). The reason the Court did not rely on "harm to the consuming com-
munity" is rather simple: there was no conventional proof that, as a general
matter, such harm occurs. It is surprising that Nagel does not recognize that even
the most forceful of scholarly advocates of greater regulation of adult pornography
have declined to suggest that there is sufficient proof of harm to the consumer tojustify restraint on a textually explicit fundamental right such as free speech.





C. Alternatives to the Formulaic Approach
Nagel ultimately supplements his critique by recommending alterna-
tive approaches for the exercise of judicial review. One of Nagel's alter-
natives would be to place greater reliance on "factual" determinations as
opposed to the formulaic analysis.60 Under this fact-based jurisprudence,
when the facts are "silly, unsavory or dangerous,"61 he would have the
judiciary refrain from imposing constitutional limits on government reg-
ulators. Even in the absence of tawdry facts, Nagel's "formulae free"
judiciary would focus on the particular facts of the specific case. For
example, he praises the Court's state action decision, Burton v. Wil-




Nagel's second alternative to the "formulaic style" is consistent with
his belief that many governmental successes have occurred without ju-
dicial intervention. Given such non-judicial successes, Nagel urges that
the courts should have a "willingness not to explain."65 Under this alter-
native, the judiciary should not explain and, for that matter, not decide.
66
60 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 139.
61 Id. at 47.
62 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
6 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 143-45. Without an extended analysis, I found
Nagel's praise for the Burton decision inconsistent with his understanding of
Brown as a "regional aberration." See supra text accompanying notes 15 to 24.
While both may be fact-based rather than formulaic, Burton certainly does not
fit the "regional aberration" or "no big deal" rationale.
64R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 143. As another example of the non-formulaic
decision-making, Nagel has praise, in the free speech context, for the Court's
plurality decision in the F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). With-
out engaging in a full-scale analysis of Pacifica Foundation, I would note two
things. First, the Court itself seems to have, at least implicitly, rejected further
reliance on the analysis in Pacifica Foundation. See Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2837 (1989) (unanimous opinion on this
point). See also Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Second, despite Nagel's belief that a factual
decisionmaking is the appropriate approach for the Court, he is simply wrong
about the facts in Pacifica Foundation. Whatever the merits of the decision may
be in terms of alleged consistency with the "popular culture," Pacifica Foundation
cannot be justified on the basis of its facts. It has all the indicia of a trumped-up
action. See L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 185-
90 (1987).
While Nagel concedes that the monologue of humorist George Carlin in Pacifica
Foundation "is funny and for some it may be useful," he asserts that reasonable
people can disagree as to the "overall worth" of the monologue. R. NAGEL, supra
note 1, at 179 n.130. Regarding whether reasonable people could disagree, Nagel
is surely right. He is, however, surely wrong to imply that the regulation of free
speech is determined by the "reasonable person" standard.
65 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 131.
1 See id. at 25. See also Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, supra note 3, at
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In Nagel's view, one reason that judges should avoid activist judicial
review is that "politicians" have been more important than the judiciary
in ending repression.6 7 In fact, Nagel argues that the public generally is
more accommodating to the individual, non-majoritarian liberties than
is the judiciary s This is not a particularly new claim; opponents of ju-
dicial activism have traditionally made it. For example, Justice Felix
Frankfurter once denounced judicial activism by explaining that in a
"democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused pop-
ular conscience."69 Echoing the same refrain, Judge (now Justice) Antonin
Scalia has proclaimed that the political process is superior to judicial
protection of civil liberties; he testified that, in his opinion, "the amend-
ments, by themselves, do not do anything.170 However, while Nagel's view
is not exactly new, it is argued forcefully, and it flourishes the imprimatur
of empiricism.
Nagel's conclusion that the public, and its majoritarian representatives,
are more tolerant and understanding of non-majoritarian individual lib-
erties than is the constitutionally independent, and consequently isolated,
class of federal judges7' is an intriguing argument. It ought to make
judges, and lawyers, sensitive to the assumptions commonly underlying
judicial review. At this level, Nagel has performed an important scholarly
service.
72
67 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 37. As to the question of the relative protection
afforded by politicians as opposed to the judiciary, I found it curious that Nagel
did not mention one of the best examples of his point. After the Supreme Court's
decisions in Geduldig v. Aeillo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Electric v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the "politicians" responded with surprising speed
and passed the 1978 Pregnancy Amendments to Title VII, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). The amendment countermanded the
result in Gilbert and effectively nullified the Court's rather wooden reasoning in
Geduldig.
See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 26.
69 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).10 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate: Nom-
ination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1986).
11 But see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 183 (1980) ("[C]onstitutional law
appropriately exists for those situations where representative government cannot
be trusted ... ").
72 At the bottom, however, it should be recognized that Nagel's position is
ultimately an empirical question. In that regard, I do not believe that Nagel has
provided sufficient empirical data to substantiate his position. See M. TUSHNET,
supra note 5, at 127 (suggesting that, to the extent majoritarian legislators may
be more tolerant of individual liberties, it is because they have been, and are,




II. THE FORMULAIC CRITIQUE OF MODERN FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Although Nagel extends his theme to federalism73 and equal protec-
tion,74 Nagel's discussion of free speech presents his analysis most directly
and expansively. In fact, Chapter Three seems to be the book's main
example of the "assaultive jurisprudence."7 5 Given Nagel's emphasis on
the free speech doctrine, and my own interest in it, I shall concentrate
my subsequent remarks on Nagel's critique of this area.
In Chapter Three, Nagel generally concludes that modern free speech
analysis is a set of "misguided constitutional doctrines.
176 His analysis
starts with certain assumptions regarding the "tradition of optimism"
that purportedly underlies parts of the modern doctrine.
77 Following the
identification of his premise, Nagel's critique proceeds through three
stages. Initially he attacks the modern free speech doctrine for being too
activist-for deciding rather than not deciding cases. At the second stage,
the Nagel critique concedes that some decisions must be made, but he
argues that formulaic decisions are inferior to fact-based decisions. At
the third stage of his critique, Nagel implicitly concedes that some de-
cisions will uphold free speech claims even under a fact-based approach.
At this level, Nagel's critique retreats to a majoritarian rationale: even
a fact-based decision should be avoided if the "popular culture" would
disapprove. Thus, the bottom line of his free speech critique is the pur-
ported intolerance of the "popular culture" to individual assertions of free
speech interests by persons purportedly outside the "popular culture."
Under these circumstances, as with his analysis of Brown, Nagel has
a responsibility to substantiate his critical premise of public intolerance.
At least in these essays, he has not.
More generally, the failure of Constitutional Cultures derives from sev-
eral deficiencies. As noted above, these include (1) a failure to define basic
terms; (2) an erroneous characterization of the premises of modern free
speech doctrine; and (3) inadequate supporting data for his "assaultive-
ness" theory.
A. The Pervasive Definitional Problem
The bottom line, and the uniqueness, of Nagel's argument is the notion
that the Court's formulaic decisions have assaulted the values of the
"popular culture." Surprisingly, despite the obvious significance of the
71 See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 64-65. See also M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at
42 n.64 (critique of Nagel's praise for the National League of Cities decision).
74 See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 95.75 Id. at 155.
t6 Id. at 33.
7 Id. at 31.
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"popular culture" concept, it is never defined.78 Moreover, despite its fre-
quent invocation, the book is short on any explanation.
Eventually, over the course of the book, it seems that Nagel uses the
term "popular culture" as a synonym for the phrase "traditional culture."
While certain facets of this concept such as respect for tradition 79 can be
readily inferred, the traditional culture concept is left curiously unex-
plained.
Since these terms serve as the analytical measuring posts for the con-
demned "assaultiveness" of the formulaic modern doctrine, the ambiguity
is a serious problem. 80 Perhaps it is a credit to Nagel's style that one can
continue to follow his critique even in the absence of a clear referent for
the alleged assaultiveness. Accordingly, I shall turn to the premises of
Nagel's critique of the modern free speech doctrine.81
B. Nagel's Erroneous "Enhancement" Premise
Nagel states his premise regarding modern free speech doctrine in at
least two different ways. At one point he states that the fundamental
premise of modern free speech doctrine is "that adjudication can, if prop-
erly performed, be expected to protect the free exchange of ideas signif-
icantly. '8 2 In another part of his chapter, however, Nagel states his
premise as the "dominating idea in modern free speech theory and practice
is that judges should shape the content of legal rules in a manner that
enhances systematic objectives as vigorous or useful public debate. 8 3
Taken together, these statements suggest that Nagel's critique rests on
the premise that modern free speech doctrine is designed to enhance the
quality and quantity of "speech."'
71 See id. at 155 ("popular culture"); 57 ("popular support"); 58 ("public un-derstanding") and 1 (use of terms "political culture" and "general political cul-
ture").
71 See id. at 118.
- See Nagel, Teaching Tolerance, 75 CALiF. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (1987) (criti-
cizing Bollinger's Tolerant Society for failing to define critical terms adequately).
81 In addition, it seems that the terms are used in an ironic "insider" sense: if
you don't know what the values of the "popular culture" are, you should not
bother asking since you will not understand anyway.
82 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 30. The operative word in this statement is
"protect," and that term is basically ambiguous.
8 Id. at 34. See Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, supra note 3, at 293.
1 See Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL
L. REv. 302, 312 (1984) (using the term "enhance"). In this article, the basis of
chapter three in Constitutional Cultures, Nagel stated that the "dominant con-
sensus [of the Free Speech doctrine] holds that the adjudication of individual
cases can promote the level and quality of public debate." Id. at 303 (emphasis
added). While the book uses the verbs "protect" and "shape," I believe that, when
read as a whole, Nagel's choice of the term "enhance" in his article more precisely
reflects his position.
Although it probably does not merit an extended discussion, it is my perception
that, in his article, Nagel was more cautious in his identification of the premise
of free speech doctrine. In the 1984 article, he recognized that enhancement may
not be the only premise of free speech doctrine. See id. at 317. By the time of his
book, however, his former caution is abandoned, and Nagel apparently asserts




Based on his enhancement premise, Nagel's analysis of various free
speech decisions leads to his conclusion that the adjudicatory approach
and judges are "unsuited for the broad task" of affirmatively shaping the
nature of public debate.8 5 He is, of course, right; adjudication of specific,
concrete disputes is not a particularly efficient way to enhance the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Enhancement, however, is not the goal of the free speech
doctrine.8
6
Nagel's enhancement premise mischaracterizes the nature of the mod-
ern free speech doctrine by suggesting that the doctrine involves an af-
firmative duty to shape the nature of the so-called public debate.87 Instead,
the free speech clause, like certain other constitutional provisions," iden-
tifies certain limits on the government's regulatory power over the liberty
interests possessed by each individual. 9 Despite the citations to
Emerson 9 who, like most scholars in this area, has made statements that
might be interpreted to support the optimistic tradition, there normally
is no affirmative duty on the part of the government to enhance the
individual liberty interest in freedom of speech. Put more bluntly, the
fundamental nature of the free speech protection is negative as opposed
to affirmative.9 1
To the extent that Nagel's argument proceeds from the premise that
the free speech doctrine creates an affirmative duty to enhance the non-
governmental marketplace of ideas, the remainder of his analysis is based
on a proverbial "straw figure." A recognition of his erroneous premise
substantially undercuts, in my view, the force of Nagel's argument.
92
15R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 35.
16See Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and
Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1405, 1424 (1987); Schauer,
The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
17 See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864 (1986).
88 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 195 (1989) (substantive due process); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348
(1986) (procedural due process). To the extent that the Court's recent jurisprud-
ence regarding the due process clause relies on the distinction between "positive"
and "negative" constitutional rights, it is an appropriate analogy to the negative
liberty of the free speech clause. Although this essay is not the place for an
extended discussion, I would note that the Court's recent "affirmative duty" jur-
isprudence is, in some quarters, controversial and that it is not unreasonable, at
this juncture, to have substantial reservations about the historical bases of the
Court's analysis. Even though the framers of the free speech clause rather ob-
viously employed a "negative liberty" approach, it is not so clear, to my reading,
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment, some eighty years later, neces-
sarily employed exactly the same approach.
89 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 5 at 179; Post, supra note 3, at 638 (free speech
doctrine performs a "wholly negative function of shielding speakers").
90 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 34. See also id. at 168-69 n.52.
91 See Post, supra note 3, at 686 ("radical negativity").
92 This is not the place for an extended discussion, but the conclusion that free
speech doctrine is essentially negative is supported through all the commonly
employed analytical approaches. First, the text of the free speech clause is ob-
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C. Nagel's Support for His Critique
To the extent that Nagel's enhancement premise has any merit, it is
necessary to examine the items he marshals in support of his critique of
the modern free speech doctrine. Although Nagel assembles an array of
historical and other traditional materials for consideration, he seems to
primarily rely on his analysis of a number of recent Supreme Court
decisions. He particularly criticizes the Court's decisions in Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim93 and Cohen v. California.94 He sees them as the leading ex-
amples of assaultive jurisprudence. Accordingly, I shall focus on his anal-
ysis of Schad and Cohen.
1. Schad v. Mt. Ephraim: Free Speech Protection
Against Pretextual Regulation
The facts of Schad concern a city's purported effort to protect the "tone"
of its social setting by prohibiting "all live entertainment." In Schad, a
divided Court held that, as challenged by a purveyor of live nude dancing,
an ordinance purporting to ban all "live entertainment" within the mu-
nicipal boundaries was unconstitutional.9 5 In an effort to avoid the strict
scrutiny standard, the city tried to justify its ordinance as a content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation.9 6 Although the ordinance was
facially even-handed, the city had carved out certain exceptions to the
ban.9 7 Accordingly, Schad ultimately turned on whether the city's reg-
ulation was actually neutral as to the content of the regulated speech.98
In light of the exceptions, the Court determined that the regulation was
directed to the content of the speech and accordingly applied heightened
scrutiny.99
Nagel considers this protection of live nude dancing as either silly or
dangerous. 100 He sees decisions such as Schad as simply protecting some-
thing tawdry. It is, however, apparent that although the Schad opinions
are not a model of clarity, a majority of the Schad Court saw something
different.
viously negative: "Congress shall make no law ... " U.S. CONST., amend. I. Second,
the legislative history, although scant, "indicates the ... negative focus" of the
clause. Cass, supra note 86, at 1447. Third, the free speech precedents, including
those discussed herein, are manifestly consistent with a negative focus. Fourth,
the policies underlying the free speech clause are appropriately served by a neg-
ative vision. See Post, supra note 3, at 637. While an alternative policy analysis
could support the affirmative enhancement theory, it is not too much to expect
that such an analysis should have at least some degree of judicial adoption before
it can be asserted as the "dominant consensus." See C.E. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989).
93 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
9 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
95 452 U.S. at 65.
9Id. at 74-75.
91 Id. at 73 n.14.
98 Id. at 74-75.
See id. at 72.




Of course, as Nagel recognizes, much depends on the level of abstraction
that one employs.' 0 ' It seems that the majority and concurring opinions
in Schad discerned that the municipality formulated an after-the-fact
justification of its action. 10 2 Thus, it appears that the Schad Court was
rejecting an attempt by the government to regulate on pretextual
grounds.0 3 Understood at this level, Schad stands for the remarkably
uncontroversial proposition that government regulators are required, at
a minimum, to be non-pretextual in their reasoning. 0 4 At this level, it
is hard to imagine anyone disagreeing with the Court's decision.
Actually, Nagel's criticism of Schad is ironic since Schad is not a par-
ticularly "formulaic" decision. The Schad decision was heavily "fact
based." It seems to me that, in this regard, Nagel is critical of precisely
the type of methodology that he asserts that courts should adopt.
10 5
Perhaps, as an alternative, Nagel's analysis can be seen as criticism
of the Court's concern about pretext. 1 6 Certainly, the government is en-
titled to an initial presumption of good faith. The presumption of good
faith, however, cannot be conclusive. It is hard to understand why, given
the important nature of free speech rights, Nagel would argue for a con-
tinuation of the presumption when, as in Schad, government officials
obviously engaged in censorial conduct.
1 0 7
2. Cohen v. California: Free Speech Protection
for "Offensive" Speech
The ironic inconsistency between Nagel's assaultiveness theory and his
supporting data is also present in his discussion of the Cohen decision
10 Id. at 95.
102 452 U.S. at 74.
103 In this regard, I consider the city's justification "pretextual" because the
city was not forthright about its purposes. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willing-
boro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972); Day, The
Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19
ARIz. ST. L.J. 195, 207 (1987).
104 t may be that Nagel would actually have preferred a decision in Schad
that held that live nude dancing is not "protected speech" under the free speech
clause. See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct.
2829, 2835 (1989) (obscenity is not "protected speech"). In Schad, that type of
analysis certainly would have resulted in a simpler decision. Interestingly, how-
ever, it would not have been as "fact-based" a decision as Nagel prefers elsewhere
in his book.
105 Moreover, the fractionated opinions in Schad illustrate the difficulties that
the Court would have when it approaches a complex issue with a fact-based
approach.
106 See Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, supra note 3, at 295 (the Court should
not search for "the possibility of abuse").
101 But see R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 112 (asserting the government's justifi-
cation should be routinely "understood on its own terms, not as a proxy for some
ulterior purpose"). Nagel's willingness to excuse pretextual reasoning and to
believe the government's asserted reasons seems overly generous. Of course, he
apparently would argue that the governmental officials are "pushed" into using
pretextual rationales by the Court's insistence on rationalism. See id. at 116.
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which held that the government could not criminalize Cohen's placement
of the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket. It is, perhaps, in his critique
of the Cohen decision that Nagel's ambivalence about the modern free
speech doctrine is best displayed.108 On the one hand, Nagel generally
criticizes the free speech doctrine for its failure to acknowledge "com-
plexity" appropriately. 109 On the other hand, even though it is a splendid
example of judicial analysis of a complex issue, Nagel is critical of the
Cohen decision.110
Nagel's criticism of the Cohen decision follows his general critique, but
he experiences some problems. First, the Cohen decision is problematic
for Nagel primarily because it does not proceed from the formulaic prem-
ises that he so severely critiques. Cohen is, like Schad, a fact-based de-
cision. For example, the Court emphasized that Cohen's jacket-with the
slogan "Fuck The Draft" on the back-was "folded over his arm" while
Cohen was inside the courtroom.'
Second, the Cohen decision satisfies the Nagel requirement of "common
experience." Prior to Cohen, the Court certainly had a "body of common
experience" with so-called "offensive speech."'12 In light of its experience
with provocative language, the Cohen Court merely acknowledged that,
except in the most narrow set of circumstances, "offensive speech" simply
does not harm anyone or create violence."13
Third, the Cohen decision also avoids the pitfalls of the optimistic tra-
dition. The Cohen Court was not "enhancing" the quality of speech. Con-
sistent With the traditional, negative focus of the free speech doctrine,
the Cohen Court decided that Cohen should not be imprisoned simply
because he opposed the war in Viet Nam." 4
10 81 d. at 44-45.
109 Id. at 43.
1o0 Cohen was written by the quintessential judicial conservative, the second
Justice Harlan. See Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1972).
- Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19 n.3.
112 See, e.g., Strombert v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 362 (1931) (red flag and
"Communist" speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) ("a gen-
eral attack on all organized religious systems"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 17 (1949) (speaker referred to crowd as "scum"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 542 (1965) (the song "We Shall Overcome"); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S.
195, 196 (1966) (accusing Police Chief of illegal conduct); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 579 (1969) ("We don't need no damn flag."); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (per curiam) (televised Ku Klux Klan speech "derogatory
of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews"). Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
330 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (statements that President Truman was a
"bum"); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 668 (1944) (in context of
denaturalization case, "oft-repeated admiration for the Nazi Government").1- See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23.




In light of his general analysis, Nagel should praise Cohen, not deni-
grate it. In Cohen, the Court did not apply formulas. Rather, in Cohen,
as in Brown, the Court recognized, and judicially incorporated, a formula
from the non-judicial culture.115 In Cohen, the Court apparently followed
the lead of the popular culture-much as Nagel would have us believe
was the situation regarding the Brown decision.
In the face of these circumstances, Nagel indicates that, at least at
certain levbls, the propriety of the analysis in Cohen is "unanswerable."
1 16
Yet, despite these concessions to the Court's analysis, Nagel ultimately
asserts that Cohen is one of the "incongruities" of the free speech doc-
trine.1 1 7 At this point, Nagel's critique shifts from traditional legal anal-
ysis to an essentially empirical model. Nagel asserts that Cohen is an
inappropriate decision, not because it is formulaic, but because it is the
kind of decision that the public "disapproves of."'1 8 He seems slightly
embarrassed to make this assertion, but he quite rightly notes that po-
tential public disapproval "is a fact that must be contended with."'
119
This concern about increasing public intolerance for civil liberties is
the unique feature of Nagel's analysis of the free speech doctrine. Nagel's
argument proceeds from the premise that, over the continuum of Amer-
ican history, the public has manifested, at least periodically, substantial
disapproval of civil liberties. 20 But if, as Nagel asserts, the assaultive
jurisprudence has created such public intolerance in the post-Brown era,
it should be relatively easy to find authority for that proposition. Since,
at this point, the assertion that the public is intolerant or hostile to civil
liberties is the "real world" linchpin to the soundness of his argument,
12
'
it is incumbent upon Nagel to cite something more than one 1955 book
regarding public attitudes. 22 One book-especially such a dated one-is
116 Post, supra note 3, at 647. See also Nagel, Forgetting the Constitution, supra
note 3, at 312 n.84.
116 R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 44.
"I Id. at 45. Nagel also identifies Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975), Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), and Schad,
452 U.S. 61 (1981), as "incongruities."
"I R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 45.
l1g.Id.
120 Id. at 37.
121 Id. at 49.
122 Id. at 175 n.109. The only authority cited in note 109 of Nagel's book is S.
STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF
THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND 39-47, 78-79 (1955). Nagel cites the Stouffer book
as the sole authority for his assertion that the public "generally disapproves of
[civil liberties] in concrete situations." Id. at 45. The only "concrete situation" in
the pages referenced by Nagel in the Stouffer book is the data regarding "Civil
Rights For Admitted Communist." S. STOUFFER, supra, at 39-47. It seems to me
that any generalization based solely on data regarding public attitudes-in
1954-toward "admitted communists" has a questionable foundation.
Another reason for skepticism about the persuasiveness of Nagel's assertions
is that more recent empirical data than the Stouffer Study is available. See, e.g.,
H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE
ABOUT CIvIL LIBERTIES 48-58 (1983) (discussing public opinion survey data gath-
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not sufficient to support this bottom line of his critique of the Court's free
speech decisions. 123
3. The Role of Majoritarian Intolerance in the Free Speech Doctrine
More generally, instead of Nagel's assumption that, since the Brown
decision, public hostility to civil liberties has increased, it may be that
public attitudes toward civil liberties have become more tolerant. In the
post-Brown era, the popular culture may tolerate silly or unsavory
speech-like that in Cohen. The public may even agree, as Justice Harlan
said, that "one man's lyric is another's vulgarity."'124 At least based on
the materials assembled in Constitutional Cultures, an assumption of a
degree of public tolerance is as sound as Nagel's unsupported assertion
about public intolerance. 12 5
An extended discussion of the degree of tolerance-for nudity and of-
fensive speech-embraced by the "popular culture" is, rather obviously,
beyond the scope of this review essay. A few comments, however, may
suggest that Nagel's assumptions are at least not immediately persuasive.
Regarding nudity, the generally available data suggests that the pop-
ular culture may not be as squeamish as Nagel suggests. After all, to
take one example from the popular culture, the Sports Illustrated Annual
Swimsuit Issue is a perennial best seller-even without any pretext that
its popularity might be traced to the "articles." If the popular culture
would be offended by nudity, it is also hard to explain the popularity of
the performer, Madonna. It is, generally, hard to defend Nagel's assump-
tion regarding alleged public hostility to nudity.
ered during 1978-79 and 1976-77). It appears that at least one of the more recent
studies may provide some support for Nagel's assertion about public intolerance.
See id. at 108 (discussing public tolerance for symbolic speech). Although I have
not made an extensive survey, the more recent data, as far as I can tell, does not
support the assertion that the Court's free speech decisions have triggered in-
creased public intolerance for civil liberties.
123 Nagel cites several other sources (in addition to the Stouffer book) as sup-
porting his assertions that the assaultive judicial decisions have fostered, or might
foster, increased public intolerance for civil rights. See R. NAGEL, supra note 1,
at 165 n.16. While these sources may support a discussion about the historic
sources of intolerance, they do not support Nagel's empirical assertion that, after
the Brown decision, the assaultive jurisprudence has triggered increased public
intolerance.
Of course, establishing that point may be the goal of Nagel's book. As the
discussion in the text suggests, I do not believe the goal was achieved.
124 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
121 See S. STOUFFER, supra note 122, at 107 (even in 1954, the younger, better-
educated respondents were more tolerant than older respondents). I, for one, am
simply not persuaded that, in the post-Ollie North era, the members of the general
public are so disapproving of the exercise of free speech that they will react with





The data regarding offensive speech seems more complex, but Nagel's
unsupported assumptions are again questionable. When one considers,
for example, that the most popular television shows of the 1970s were
All in the Family and M.A.S.H.,126 and that, in the 1980s, the "Rambo"
character and Eddie Murphy's rendition of a "Beverly Hills" cop were
phenomenally successful movie figures, 127 it is hard to conclude that ir-
reverence for authority is "offensive" to the popular culture. As for the
use of profanity, as on Cohen's jacket, it is worth remembering that
Cohen's profanity was positively meager when compared to then-Presi-
dent Nixon's discussions in the Oval Office. In the 1980s, it is difficult to
assume that the popular culture is offended by profanity when movies
such as Prizzi's Honor or Raging Bull are among the recent decade's box
office successes.128 As journalist Richard Corliss has noted, Americans
today "live in a four-letter world.'
1 29
At least as far as the mass media are reflective of the popular culture,
neither the nudity of Schad nor the profanity of Cohen are anything close
to "assaultive of the larger culture." Of course, here is where the "popular"
culture may diverge from the "traditional" culture. But that is precisely
my point: Nagel has not identified the referent for evaluating the pur-
ported assaultiveness of the modern free speech doctrine.
Moreover, apart from the definitional problems, Nagel's chosen ex-
amples do not substantiate his assaultiveness critique or his assumption
about the increasing intolerance of the popular culture in the post-Brown
era. Nagel's pessimism about the free speech doctrine is not justified-at
least not in this set of essays.
III. A FORMULAIC CONCLUSION
That Nagel would rely so heavily, regarding the existence of intolerance
to free speech in the "popular culture," on a study published in 1955 is,
it seems to me, particularly ironic.' 30 His assertion that the Court's for-
mulaic decisions have assaulted the popular culture and, consequently,
lead to increased public intolerance is, after all, the unique feature of his
argument. The irony regarding his supporting authorities extends beyond
his analysis of free speech doctrine and potentially tempers the persu-
asiveness of his more general theme: the inappropriateness of judicial
activism.
Nagel both starts and ends his book with a discussion of the role of the
Brown decision as a model for judicial review.'3' He argues that, not-
withstanding the correctness of judicial review in the case of Brown,
12 D. WALLECHINSKY & I. WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 413-16 (1981)
(based on A.C. Nielsen ratings).
12,7 Faces of the Decade, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 89.
12 8 Id. at 101.
129R. Corliss, X Rated, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 94.
130 See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 175 n.109.
,31 See id. at 139, 154.
1991]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
continued use of the Brown methodology has weakened the public un-
derstanding of the Court's role and, consequently, has undermined the
public tolerance of civil liberties within the country.l12 According to Nagel,
the 1954 Brown decision triggered the formulaic judicial activism; such
activism, in turn, generated public intolerance to free speech and other
civil liberties. Under these circumstances, for him to rely on a book pub-
lished in 1955 and a study done before the Brown decision3 as the sole
authority for the existence of the asserted public intolerance seems highly
incongruous. If the activism of Brown was good, but activist decision-
making since Brown has fostered public hostility to civil liberties, it is
incumbent on Nagel to provide some relatively current data supportive
of this position.
Despite what I believe are some shortcomings in the analysis, the Nagel
critique of modern constitutional law is insightful and attractive. As I
note above, I believe it reminds lawyers and judges that alternative ap-
proaches to a Brown model should be considered. It should not, however,
be misapplied. When misapplied, as with respect to the "unanswerable"
Cohen decision, Nagel's analysis is simply unpersuasive and, perhaps,
counterproductive to his concern for limiting judicial activism.
132 See id. at 155. See also id. at 57 (judicial decisions upholding free speech
claims have "eroded popular support").
13 The Brown decision was handed down on May 17, 1954. 347 U.S. at 483.
The interviews underlying the Stouffer study occurred during May, June and
July of 1954. See S. STOUFFER, supra note 122, at 15. As such, the authority Nagel
relies upon largely predates the event he identifies as the trigger for the debase-
ment of popular understanding.
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